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In the Brief of Appellee Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission"), the
Commission confuses in its argument two entirely separate principles. The
Commission would have the often used inquiry "in lieu of what were the damages
awarded" to answer the question of whether taxing jurisdiction exists, rather than its
proper use, one which is not at issue in this case, to answer the question of whether
income is taxable and, if so, how? This fundamental error must be rejected as
inconsistent not only with the Utah statutes that extend taxing jurisdiction to nonresidents in extremely limited circumstances, but also as in conflict with due process of
law, the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United
States Constitution.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENT ABOUT THE CHARACTER AND NATURE OF THE
MANDELLS' 2001 INCOME FAILS TO ADDRESS WHETHER UTAH HAS TAXING
JURISDICTION OVER THE MANDELLS IN 2001- IT PLAINLY DOES NOT.

The Commission's argument in Point I of its Brief that it correctly determined the
character and nature of the proceeds leaves the question open as to what it in fact
determined. Nothing in Point I identifies the determination to which the Commission
refers. The Commission quotes the determination in Pennzoil Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 33 P.3d 314 (Ore. 2001), that "Pennzoil received the settlement proceeds
[from Texaco] in lieu of its agreement with Getty and that the agreement gave rise to
the disputed income." Id. at 317. What the Commission overlooks, however, is that in
the tax year at issue, 1988, Pennzoil was conducting business within the state of
Oregon. Id. at 316 ("Pennzoil's only activity in Oregon during the 1988 tax year was the
operation of a facility designed to blend, package, and distribute motor oil and related
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automotive products.")
It is an important point, so bears repeating- Pennzoil was physically present
within the state of Oregon during the tax year in question. Here, in contrast, the
Mandells had no presence within Utah at any time during the tax year in question. See
FOF If 30 (Tor the tax year in question, 2001, [the Mandells] were no longer Utah
resident individuals for state income tax purposes."). R. 44. Significantly, the
Commission also made no finding that the Mandells maintained any commercial
domicile within Utah during 2001, the tax year in question. The undisputed testimony,
including the concessions by Mr. Taylor on behalf of the Auditing Division, that Mr.
Mandell did not have a commercial domicile in the state of Utah for tax year 2001,
within the meaning of

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-103(1 )(d) (Tr. 129:1-1 8), would have

precluded any such finding.
Had Mr. Whitworth honestly reported the value of HOA to the Mandells in 1998,
they would have demanded (and received) a larger purchase price from Champion in
1998 for their shares. But, unlike Pennzoil, which was present in Oregon when it
received its settlement proceeds, the Mandells had long previously departed Utah for
Nevada, as they have the privilege to do without being subjected to further Utah tax.
Since Pennzoil was present within Oregon at the time it received the settlement
proceeds, it was subject to unitary taxation principles. See Pennzoil, 33 P.3d at 545.
Once it is established that a corporation is present within a state and subject to
unitary taxation, the essential inquiry then becomes whether the income is
apportionable to the taxing state, as business income. See id. at 546. It is in that
context that the "character and nature" inquiry became relevant to taxation in Pennzoil.
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Since the Mandells had no domicile or commercial residence within Utah during
2001, the tax year in question, the inquiry is immaterial, as least as to the state of Utah,
which has no taxing jurisdiction. The inquiry is pertinent only to whether the Mandells
may sustain their claim of capital gains treatment on their federal income tax return.
II.

THE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENT THAT THE MANDELLS MUST MARSHALL EVIDENCE
FAILS BECAUSE THE MANDELLS DO NOT CHALLENGE ANY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT.

There is no question that if the Mandells had challenged a finding of fact, that
they would have been subject to the requirement that they marshall all evidence in
support of the challenged finding. See Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 922
(Utah 1988). The Mandells have not challenged, however, a single finding. The
marshalling requirement therefore does not apply at all.
The Commission's argument is that the Mandells are challenging Conclusion of
Law No. 2, which states: "2. As the amount of the litigation proceeds are in lieu of
funds that Mr. Mandell should have received at the time he was a Utah resident and
had sold the stock in his Utah business, the funds are taxable as Utah Source income
pursuant to Utah Code Sees. 59-10-116, 117 & 118." R. 47. The Commission then
argues that, although Conclusion No. 2 is not designated as a Finding of Fact that it
really should be considered as one. Setting aside the lack of notice issues that such a
late shift would cause with respect to any marshalling requirement, Conclusion No. 2 is
plainly a conclusion. There has never been a question that, had Mr. Whitworth been
honest, the agreement between the Mandells and Champion would have contained a
higher price for the Mandells' stock. The conclusion that the income in a subsequent
year, derived from litigating a fraud claim, at a time when the Mandells have no physical
presence in Utah, when the findings state that they are domiciled in Nevada and when
3

the findings are silent on whether a commercial domicile exists in Utah, but as to which
the testimony is uncontroverted and Mr. Taylor from the Auditing Division conceded that
the Mandells had no commercial domicile in Utah, is erroneous as a matter of law.
There is nothing to marshall.
The Commission cites to

UTAH CODE ANN.

59-10-116, to -118, but left out any

discussion of the requirements of section 117 to include income as Utah source
income. Section 117 sets forth what can be included in adjusted gross income for
nonresidents, as set forth in pertinent part:
Adjusted Gross Income derived from Utah sources
(1) For purposes of Section 59-10-116, adjusted gross income derived from Utah
sources includes those items includable in adjusted gross income attributable to
or resulting from:
(b) the carrying on of a business, trade, profession, or occupation in this
state.
(2) For the purposes of Subsection (1):
(a) Income from intangible personal property, including annuities,
dividends, interest, and gains from the disposition of intangible personal
property shall constitute income derived from Utah sources only to the
extent that such income is from property employed in a trade, business,
profession, or occupation carried on in this state;...
UTAH CODE ANN.

§59-10-117(1), (2)(a) (emphasis added). Finding No. 8 establishes

that Mr. Mandell performed no services within Utah for HAU after 1999 ("8. Mr. Mandell
managed HAU from its date of incorporation and the Mandells were residents of Utah
from 1995 to March of 1999.") R. 41. In 1999, the Mandells "changed their domicile
and permanently moved to the state of Nevada in 1999. For the tax year in question,
2001, they were no longer Utah resident individuals for state income tax purposes."
Finding No. 30. R. 44. There is no finding whatsoever that either of the Mandells,
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themselves, "carr[ied] on Q a business, trade, profession, or occupation in this statef,]"
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-117(1), in 2001, or that either of them received "income Q from

property employed in a trade, business, profession, or occupation carried on in this
statef,]"

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-117(2)(a), in 2001, as is required by the statutes so

as to tax the income. Section 116 of the Code expressly limits Utah's income tax
percentage to a nonresident's "percentage equal to a nonresident individual's adjusted
gross income for the taxable year received from Utah sources, as determined under
Section 59-10-117, divided by the difference between:..."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-

116(c). Where the Utah source income is zero, the Utah income tax percentage is
zero.
Section 118 also excludes the Mandells' 2001 income from any possibility of
Utah taxation. "Business income" means "income arising from transactions and activity
in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and includes income from
tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the
property constitutes integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business
operations."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-118(1 )(a). There is no Finding that the Mandells

earned any income in 2001 as the result of transactions and activity in the regular
course of the taxpayer's trade, so the Mandells had no business income in Utah in
2001. "'Commercial domicile' means the principal place from which the trade or
business of the taxpayer is directed or managed."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-118(1 )(b).

There is no Finding that the Mandells had any commercial domicile within Utah in 2001.
Notably, the Utah Code states that "[c]apital gains and losses from sales of intangible
personal property are allocable to this state if the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in
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this state."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-118(5)(c). Although there is no finding about a

commercial domicile for the Mandells, Mr. Taylor, of the Auditing Division, conceded
that the Mandells had no commercial domicile within Utah in the tax year at issue, 2001.
Tr. at 129:1-18. "Stocks" fall squarely under the definition of "intangible property" in the
Property Tax Code.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-2-102(19)(a)(iv). So even if the character

and nature of the Mandells' income received in 2001 had been determined, by a
Finding, to be capital gain from the sale of stock, and the Commission made no such
Finding, where there is no Finding that the Mandells had a commercial domicile in Utah
in 2001, and there is no such Finding, the statute itself would not allow taxation of any
2001 capital gain from the sale of stock to the state of Utah.
Of course, the Commission not only did not make a Finding that stock was sold
in 2001, it plainly recognized the reality that the Mandells' 2001 income came from the
settlement of a chose in action. See Finding Nos. 31-34, R44-45 (describing the chose
in action and the action filed in Nevada based on the chose in action). The
Commission also entered its Finding that the settlement of the chose in action directly
led to the Mandells' receipt of income in 2001. Finding No. 35, R.45. Although the
Commission found that such income resulted in the Mandells having received capital
gain income from the sale of their stock, id., a position the Mandells took with the IRS,
see Finding No. 36, R.45, such Finding does not alter the fact that there is no Finding
and no basis for any Finding that the Mandells had a commercial domicile in Utah in
2001, as is required for capital gain income from the sale of stock, received in 2001, to
be taxable to Utah in 2001.
Because the Mandells do not challenge any Finding, marshalling is not required.
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Because the Commission did not and could not, on the record before it, enter any
Finding that the Mandells had a commercial domicile in Utah in 2001 or earned any
business income in Utah in 2001, the decision must be reversed, based strictly on the
Utah statutes, themselves. This simply confirms the common law rule the Mandells
cited in their Opening Brief, that the chose in action held by the Mandells was domiciled
where the taxpayer was domiciled. In 2001, there was no connection between the state
of Utah and the income received from the chose in action, regardless of the fact that it
may be capital gain income.
III.

T H E COMMISSION'S ARGUMENTS ABOUT W H A T WOULD HAVE BEEN UTAH
SOURCE INCOME IN 1998, W H E N THE MANDELLS WERE DOMICILED IN UTAH,
IGNORES THE UTAH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH SOURCE INCOME FOR
T H E TAX YEAR A T ISSUE, 2001.

All of the Mandells' income in 1998 was Utah Source income. They were
domiciled in Utah and they worked within and earned money within the state of Utah in
1998. In 2001, the Mandells were not domiciled in Utah, did not earn a living in Utah,
owned no property in Utah and had no connection whatsoever to Utah. There is not a
Finding that suggests otherwise.
Despite its own inability to enter any such Finding, the Commission argues that
an election made by the Mandells during 1998, to treat the sale of stock in 1998 as
though it were an asset sale, under 26 U.S.C. § 338(h)(10), subjects the Mandells to
the continuing taxing jurisdiction of the state of Utah in later years. But the tax year in
question is 2001. The target company of the acquisition, HAU, was not doing business
in Utah in 2001 and no Finding exists to suggest otherwise. HAU could not receive
income in 2001 and no Finding exists to suggest that it could or did. HAU could not
issue K-1s in 2001 and no Finding exists to suggest that it could or did. Finally, the
7

Mandells' section 338 election pertained only to the income from the sale that they
received in 1998 and no such election was made for income beyond that received by
the Mandells in 2001. No Finding to the contrary exists.
Without HAU in existence in 2001, the Mandells could not have a commercial
domicile in Utah in 2001 and, again, no Finding suggests they did. So, again, the
Commission runs headlong into the reality that the Mandells had no connection to Utah
in 2001. The Mandells owned no property, real or tangible, within Utah in 2001, and
they did not carry on any business, trade, profession or occupation in Utah, as required
by

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-117(1), argued on page 25 of the Commission's Brief, for a

Finding of Utah Source income. Although the Commission argues that the Mandells'
income was Utah Source income, it notably failed to make any Finding from the
evidence of the required factual predicates for such an argument. The Commission's
argument, that "[t]he fact that Mandell was a Utah resident in 1998 and a Utah
non-resident in 2001 does not alter the character and nature of the settlement proceeds
as Utah source incomef,]" Commission Brief at 29, just does not square with the plain
language of the statute defining Utah Source income. HAU's commercial domicile in
1998 was Utah, no question, but HAU had no commercial domicile in 2001, the tax year
in question, and no Finding suggests otherwise.
The Commission argues that the Mandells' settlement of the chose in action was
"just a reallocation between Mandell and Whitworth of the proceeds from the purchase
price." Commission Brief at 31. That makes a strongly contested fraud action sound
like the grant of a professional courtesy. The action sought recovery of damages and
attorney fees. There is no Finding that the settlement was "just a reallocation." In any
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event, though, the Mandells had no presence in Utah in the tax year they received the
income. No presence equals no taxing jurisdiction.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTION CONSTRAINS UTAH'S TAXING POWER.

Although the Mandells believe that Utah's own statutory scheme protects them
against any exercise of taxing jurisdiction by the Commission for tl leir 2001 ii icon le, if
those statutes do nof, Hie (Inited States Constitution does.
A state generally has no authority to tax the income of the residents of another
state. The only exceptionis to tliat rule are where the income generated is the result of
sufficient minimum contacts between the taxpayer and the state in the yeai ii i question.
In 2001, no contacts existed between the Mandells and Utah. The Commission entered
a Finding that the Mandells were not domiciled in Utah and made no Finding although
the facts of record show, that the Mandells had no commercial domicile in Utah in 2001.
The fact that the Mandells lived in Utah in 1998 and sold the shares they (leici iii the
Utah business they owned if 11998 cannot reasonably be extended to tax them for
income they earned in 2001, by suing a Nevada Estate in the Nevada Courts for a fraud
that was actually committed on them in California. Due process prohibits Utah from
taxing these Nevada residents on their 2001 income.
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The Commission also ignores the substantial effort (let alone expense) that the
Mandells were required to put into their Nevada litigation in order to "earn" the
settlement they earned in 2001. The state of Utah had no stake in that litigation. Its
Court system was not implicated, indeed, there was no burden placed upon Utah by the
Mandells, at all. The Commerce Clause prohibits Utah from taxing these Nevada
residents for the result of their efforts in litigating in the Nevada Courts, where Utah has
had no stake in the litigation.
Finally, all other states allow citizens to leave their tax burden behind when they
move out of state, save only for select circumstances not present here. Only Utah has
attempted to interfere with the privilege of the Mandells to move to another state free of
the taxing burden of Utah. Utah therefore discriminates against its former residents in a
way that no other state does. No matter where in this vast Country one moves, the
Commission will attempt to follow. No one should have to bear the tremendous burden
and expense that the Mandells have been subjected-to in these circumstances, to free
themselves of the grip of the taxing authority of their former home state. Ask the
question whether the Mandells would be fighting this issue in Utah, at all, had they
moved to a state with an income tax higher than Utah's, rather than a state with no
income tax. The Mandells would have paid the income tax of their new state and the
state of Utah likely would never have made any assessment against them. Is the
privilege to leave behind the taxing jurisdiction of your former home inapplicable where
your new state has no income tax? That is not a decision for Utah to make. Having no
connections to Utah in 2001, the Mandells are entitled to be free of the Utah taxing
authorities, just like they would have been had they moved to a state that had a higher
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income tax.
CONCLUSION

The Mandells had no connection to Utah in 2001. The Commission's decision
should be reversed, the determination of deficient y quashed .md IIn• M.-indells declared
free of Utah taxing jurisdiction for the income they earned in 2001.
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